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   INTRODUCTION
A small but growing number of economists, including Ronald Coase himself, argue that 
Coase’s approach to externality problems is misrepresented by standard formulations of the 
Coase theorem (Coase 1988 and 1994; Friedman 1991; McCloskey 1998; Medema 1994 
and 1995; Medema and Samuels 1997; Posner 1993; Klaes 2000).  Despite the fact that 
Coase’s ideas are now discussed in virtually every undergraduate microeconomics textbook, 
Coase et al. believe that, “to a considerable extent, what is taught in the textbooks is the 
[externality] theory as it existed before Coase” (Friedman 1991).  Our aim in this paper is to 
investigate this claim: to identify the distinctive features of Coase’s externality analysis; to survey 
current introductory and intermediate microeconomics texts to determine whether and to what 
degree they “get it wrong”; and, in conclusion, to consider the implications of our findings for 
economic education.  
COASE’S TWO-STAGE ARGUMENT IN “THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST” 
Coase’s aim in “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) was to criticize the modern theory
of negative externalities by “exposing the weaknesses of A. C. Pigou’s analysis of the 
divergence between private and social products” (Coase 1994, 10).   Pigou’s Economics of 
Welfare (1960 [1932]) had inspired a generation of economists to see taxes and regulations as 
the best way to promote economic efficiency in the presence of spillover costs.  Coase attacks 
this analysis on a number of levels, beginning with Pigou’s definition of the problem.  Pigou 
defines a negative externality as a perpetrator/victim situation in which one party is causally and 
legally liable.  Coase, however, argues that such problems are inherently reciprocal, arising from 
incompatible interactions between two parties rather than the harmful actions of one upon the other.  “If we are to discuss the problem in terms of causation, both parties cause the damage” 
(Coase 1960, 13).  From this perspective it is better to “forget about causation and simply ask 
which party to a harmful interaction should be induced to change his behavior (maybe both 
should be) to maximize the social product” (Posner 1993, 201).  In Coase’s words: 
The traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice that has to 
be made.  The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B 
and what has to be decided is: how should we restrain A?  But this is wrong.  We 
are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature.  To avoid the harm to B would 
inflict harm on A.  The real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed 
to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A?  The problem is to avoid the more 
serious harm (1960, 2).
Coase examines this problem under the standard assumptions of perfect competition, 
including zero transaction costs.  He is careful to present this not as a “Coase theory of 
externalities” but simply as a logical restatement of Pigou’s approach (1960, 2).  Under these 
ideal circumstances Coase shows that negative externalities are fully self-correcting; that private 
bargaining will yield an efficient (re)allocation of rights.  Further, he shows that this efficient 
solution will emerge regardless of which party bears the legal burden of accommodation. Using 
his classic example of the farmer and the cattle-raiser, Coase shows that it does not matter for 
efficiency whether the damaging agent (in this case the cattle-raiser) is held liable for the damage 
caused (1960, 2-8).  “The ultimate result (which maximizes the value of production) is 
independent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to work without cost” (1960, 
8).Coase then presents a second stage of analysis entitled “The Cost of Market 
Transactions Taken Into Account” (1960, 15).  No minor addendum to the previous 
discussion, it occupies 2/3 of the paper and is the only part for which Coase claims originality 
(Coase 1994, 9).  His aim here is to show that “[o]nce the costs of carrying out market 
transactions are taken into account . . . the initial delimitation of rights does have an effect on the 
efficiency with which the economic system operates (1960, 15-16).  Coase emphasized this 
point in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech in 1991: “[When] we move from a regime of zero 
transaction costs to one of positive transaction costs, what becomes immediately clear is the 
crucial importance of the legal system” (1994, 10).  The crucial legal/ economic problem is then 
to determine “the appropriate social arrangement for dealing with the harmful effects” (1960, 
18).  
According to Coase, this search for “the appropriate social arrangement” requires a 
flexible, case-by-case approach.  While keen to remind the Pigovians that “there is no reason to 
suppose that government regulation is called for simply because the problem is not well handled 
by the market or the firm,” he also insists that “there is no reason why, on occasion, such 
governmental regulation should not lead to an improvement in economic efficiency” (1960, 18).  
Coase rejects generic prescriptions of all kinds, calling instead for “a patient study of how, in 
practice, the market, firms, and governments handle the problem of harmful effects,” a “detailed 
investigation of the actual results of handling the problem in different ways” (18-19).
Coase therefore recasts the problem of negative externalities as a conflict of rights rather
than a perpetrator/victim situation (“A harms B”).  He also widens the range of possible 
solutions by emphasizing the possibility that B may be able to accommodate A more cheaply than A can accommodate B.  Equally important for our purpose, Coase develops these 
arguments in two distinct stages: (1) under the standard assumption of zero transaction costs (to 
show that Pigou’s conclusions are unwarranted even on their own terms); and (2) under the 
assumption of positive transaction costs.  As our textbook survey will demonstrate, most current
microeconomics texts mispresent Coase’s arguments by focusing exclusively on stage one.  
COASE VS. STIGLER’S “COASE THEOREM”
The most influential interpreter of Coase’s 1960 article was his University of Chicago 
colleague, George Stigler.  In the third edition of his Price Theory text, Stigler uses Coase’s 
farmer/cattle-raiser example to dismiss Pigou’s analysis of “external effects” and to define, for 
the first time, the Coase theorem: “The Coase theorem thus asserts that under perfect 
competition private and social costs will be equal [and] the composition of output will not be 
affected by the manner in which the law assigns liability for damage” (Stigler 1966, 113).  He 
recognizes the importance of transaction costs but only as a qualification to Coase’s perfect-
market result:  
[Coase’s] proposition must, to be sure, be qualified by an important fact.  
When a factory spews smoke on a thousand homes, the ideal solution is to 
arrange a compensation system whereby the homeowners pay the factory to 
install smoke reduction devices up to the point where the marginal cost of 
smoke reduction equals the sum of the marginal gains to the homeowners.  But 
the costs of the transaction may be prohibitive - of getting people together, of 
assessing damages, and so on - so only a statutory intervention may be feasible 
(1966, 113-114). Stigler’s theorem was instantly appealing to free-market economists who regarded it as 
proof that externality problems require no government interference.  It soon became appealing, 
for a different reason, to neo-Pigovian interventionists like Paul Samuelson.  In a 1966 paper 
Samuelson flatly rejects Stigler’s claim that Coase had dealt a fatal blow to the Pigovian theory:
The view that R. Coase has shown that externalities - like smoke nuisances - 
are not a logical blow to the Invisible Hand and do not call for coercive 
interference with laissez-faire is not mine (1966, 1411). 
Samuelson rejects Stigler’s claim because he sees Coase’s so-called theorem as nothing but a 
restatement of Adam Smith’s invisible hand principle, pointing out “the power of competitive 
markets to allocate resources efficiently” (Samuelson and Nordhaus 2001, 379).  As such he 
regards it as a non-response to the Pigovian argument that externalities are a logical blow to the 
invisible hand that do call for coercive interference with laissez faire because private solutions 
are rarely feasible.  Yet herein lies the value of Stigler’s Coase theorem to Samuelson. In his 
hands it becomes a handy strawman - a fanciful Chicago world of self-correcting externalities - 
against which to tout the scientific and practical superiority of an MIT/neo-Pigovian approach. 
Samuelson introduced externalities as a standard topic in his Principles text in the 
1960s.  His early expositions make no reference to Coase.  He presents externalities and their 
possible solutions in a thoroughly Pigovian way, as here in his 6th edition:
[W]herever there are externalities a strong case can be made for supplanting 
complete individualism with some kind of group action. . . . There is a clear-cut 
economic case for a tax (or a subsidy) wherever an external diseconomy (or 
economy) creates a divergence between private pecuniary marginal cost as seen by a firm and true social marginal cost (1964, 466).
In recent editions, Samuelson and William Nordhaus mention Stigler’s Coase theorem but 
quickly dismiss it as “too optimistic” (1998, 337) and proceed to suggest that most real-world 
externality problems require Pigovian solutions.  In this way Stigler’s theorem continues to 
provide intellectual support for the very Pigovian tradition that Coase sought to escape.
Clearly this was not Stigler’s intention.  He wanted to celebrate Coase’s insight and to 
strengthen Chicago arguments for laissez faire by extending Smith’s invisible hand to include the 
exchange of legal entitlements.  Yet he largely defeated his own purposes, and Coase’s, by 
formulating Coase’s critique as a perfect-market theorem.  The popularity of the theorem has 
obscured the uniqueness of Coase’s arguments by making it easier for economists to 
pidgeonhole and dismiss them without a hearing, or even a reading.  
Coase himself is well aware of the distance between his own views and those ascribed 
to him via Stigler’s Coase theorem.  Careful not to impugn his former colleague, Coase 
embraces the textbook theorem as a salient critique of Pigovian welfare economics (1994, 10).  
At the same time, he laments the commonplace reduction of his arguments to this zero 
transaction cost world. “The world of zero transaction costs has often been described as a 
Coasean world.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  It is the world of modern economic 
theory, one which I was hoping to persuade economists to leave” (1988, 174).  
To briefly illustrate how Coase’s approach differs from Pigovian and Stiglerian “Coase 
theorem” treatments of negative externalities, consider a competitive market in which suppliers 
emit air pollutants as a side effect of their production activities (Figure 1).  The suppliers’ actions 
create two kinds of cost: private (paid voluntarily by the suppliers themselves) and external (paid involuntarily by bystanders).  The market supply curve represents marginal private costs 
(MPC); the social cost curve represents marginal social costs (MSC), private plus external.  
Without corrective actions the market provides QE units of output.  A standard Pigovian 
analysis deems QE inefficient because it is possible to increase social welfare by eliminating the 
socially unprofitable units of output (MSB < MSC) between QE and QO.  The area E measures 
the social loss incurred at QE as well as the social gain achieved by reducing output to QO.
The Pigovian analysis assumes that the socially efficient quantity (QO) will be achieved if 
only if the polluting firms are required to pay the external costs of their actions.  A Pigou tax is 
one way to create these incentives.  If suppliers are required to pay a tax equal to the marginal 
external costs of their activities, their supply curve will shift up to coincide with the marginal  
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  0 social cost curve.  Output will fall to QO and social welfare will increase from  (A+B+F-E) to 
(A+B+F), a net gain of E.   Another way to achieve the same result would be to institute a 
liability rule under which suppliers are fully liable for damages imposed upon bystanders.  A 
third possibility is to grant bystanders a property right to “clean air.”  Bystanders then would be 
entitled to charge suppliers a pollution fee to compensate for any damages.  As Landsburg 
explains, these three methods are “three different ways of describing essentially the same thing” 
(2002, 450). All turn external costs into private costs and thus create incentives for suppliers to 
consider the effects of their pollution when deciding how much to produce.     
A standard Coasean analysis, based on the textbook theorem, would point out that the 
market can move itself to QO (assuming that QO is the most efficient solution) as long as the 
relevant property rights are clearly assigned and transaction costs are negligible.  Under these 
conditions the suppliers and bystanders would work out a mutually beneficial set of side 
payments and the efficient quantity (QO) will emerge spontaneously, regardless of the initial 
allocation of rights.  From this perspective the Pigovian approach is flawed because it fails to 
recognize the efficacy of these privately negotiated bargains.  
Coase would point out two glaring flaws in these textbook formulations.  First, the 
Pigovian approach assumes that QO - the quantity achieved through “internalization” - is the 
best possible solution.  Other possibilities are ignored.  To illustrate, consider Deirdre 
McCloskey’s example of noise pollution around airports (1998 and 1982 [352-54]):
We usually think of airplanes as the cause.  But wait.  Suppose that there were 
no ears close to the airport.  (Or that the ears were easily protected from the 
noise.) In that case the noise would be harmless, and it would be silly to curb it [with a] Pigou/Samuelson tax (McCloskey 1998, 370).  
The standard solution (reducing output to QO by “taxing the perpetrator”) may or may not be 
the most efficient in this case.  If nearby homeowners can be protected from the noise at a 
relatively low cost (e.g., by installing special noise-blocking windows or insulation, or by altering 
flight paths or flight schedules), then the best solution may be to eliminate the external costs 
altogether.  In this case the marginal social cost curve would shift down to coincide with the 
market supply curve and output would remain at QE.  Social welfare would be 
(A+B+C+D+F+G+H) minus the cost of implementing this solution.  This will be superior to the 
Pigovian QO (where social welfare was A+B+F) as long as the accommodation scheme costs 
less than (C+D+G+H). Coase offers no guarantee that such cost-effective solutions will exist in 
every case.  His only categorical claim is that the best solutions are rarely deducible from a 
generic diagram. 
   Second, Coase would remind us that the reciprocal nature of the problem becomes 
decisive for efficiency when private bargaining is precluded by high transaction costs.  In such 
cases, standard internalization schemes will increase inefficiency unless the “perpetrator” 
happens to be the low-cost accommodator.   To continue the airplane example, suppose that 
the least-cost solution is for households to install noise-reducing windows and insulation.  This 
would remove the externality and increase social welfare in the air travel market.  On the other 
hand, if airlines were required to reimburse homeowners for damages, these homeowners would
have no incentive to install soundproofing equipment.  People would continue to live near 
airports and fewer flights would be taken due to the added liability costs.  Better, in this case, is 
for households to bear the losses from the noise so that they will take steps to remedy the situation, to society’s benefit.
Coase reaches a similar conclusion in response to Pigou’s claim that British railroads 
should be liable for the uncompensated damage done to surrounding woods by sparks from 
railway engines (Coase 1960, 29-34).  Coase maintains that “[i]t is not necessarily desirable 
that the railway should be required to compensate those who suffer damage by fires caused by 
railway engines” (1960, 31).  He acknowledges that “it would not matter whether the railway 
was liable for damage caused by fires or not” (31) if transaction costs were zero. But 
transaction costs in this case were clearly significant, leading Coase to conclude that “from an 
economic point of view . . . ‘uncompensated damage’ . . . is not necessarily undesirable. 
Whether it is desirable or not depends on the particular circumstances” (1960, 34).
These examples highlight, as the standard Coase theorem does not, Coase’s “stage 
two” argument that “the technological, legal, or moral ‘cause’ of some damaging externality is 
not necessarily the correct location for liability for the damages” (McCloskey 1998, 354).  
When transaction costs are high, efficient accommodation requires a clear and economically 
correct assignment of liability; only then will the burden of accommodation be borne by the 
low-cost accommodators. The Pigovian approach will lead to efficient outcomes only in cases 
where the perpetrators are the low-cost accommodators.  In other cases a Pigovian tax (or 
equivalent liability rule) will send the wrong signals and become a barrier to efficiency.  The 
standard Pigovian graph is therefore a poor guide to policy because it fails to show that “[w]
hether it is efficient to tax pollution . . . depends on the particular circumstances at hand” (Frank 
2003, 641). 
CURRENT TEXTBOOK COVERAGEWe surveyed 45 recently published microeconomics textbooks (29 introductory and 16 
intermediate) and classified their treatment of externalities as either Coasean or “blackboard.”  
We define Coasean treatments as those that display an understanding of Coase’s arguments in 
the second part of “The Problem of Social Cost.”  It is not necessary for authors to mention 
Coase by name or to agree with his ideas in order to “get it right.”  Our results are reported in 
Table 1.
     TABLE 1   CURRENT TEXTBOOK TREATMENTS OF 
EXTERNALITIES    Coasean   Introductory Texts Intermediate Texts Frank and 
Bernanke (2001) Eaton, Eaton, and Allen (2002) Heyne, Boettke, and Prychitko (2003) Frank 
(2003) Silberberg (1999) Grinols (1994) Stockman (1999) Landsburg (2002)  Pashigian (1998)   
Blackboard   Introductory Texts Intermediate Texts Arnold (2001) Besanko and Braeutigam 
(2002) Bade and Parkin (2002) Browning and Zupan (1999) Baumol and Blinder (2000) 
Hirshleifer and Hirshleifer (1998) Boyes and Melvin (2002) Mansfield (1997) Case and Fair 
(2002) Mathis and Koscianski (2002) Colander (2001) Neilson and Winter (1998) Ekelund and 
Tollison (2000) Nicholson (2000) Gottheil (2002) Perloff (2001) Gwartney, Stroup, and Sobel 
(2000)                 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2001) Hall and Lieberman (2001) Schotter (2001) 
Mankiw (2001) Varian (1999) Mansfield and Yohe (2000)  McConnell and Brue (2002) 
McEachern (2000) Mings and Marlin (2000) O’Sullivan and Sheffrin (2000) Ruffin and Gregory 
(2001) Samuelson and Nordhaus (2001) Schiller (2000) Slavin (2002) Stiglitz and Walsh (2002) 
Taylor (2001) Tregarthen and Rittenberg (2000) Tucker (2000) 
A Few Get it Right
  Among recent introductory texts, only Frank and Bernanke (2001), Heyne, Boettke, 
and Prychitko (2003), Silberberg (1999), and Stockman (1999) present Coase’s Coase.  
Stockman’s discussion covers both stages of Coase’s argument: 
With sufficiently low transaction costs, the equilibrium is economically efficient 
regardless of whether firms have the right to pollute, though the law affects who 
makes side payments to whom.  With high transaction costs, however, laws and 
property rights affect the equilibrium quantity, perhaps producing an 
economically inefficient equilibrium (Stockman 1999, 475).Stockman demonstrates how “[s]ide payments can internalize externalities in situations with 
sufficiently low transaction costs” (475) but goes on to observe that “[i]n reality, side payments 
do not internalize all externalities. . . .  High transaction costs make side payments impractical 
when it is too difficult or costly to bring people together, bargain and agree on side payments, 
and enforce an agreement” (475).  In such cases property laws will affect economic efficiency, 
for better or worse.  “Laws and property rights . . . [will] affect marginal private costs, so they 
[will] affect equilibrium prices and quantities” (475).
Heyne, Boettke, and Prychitko (2003) present a distinctly Coasean analysis of 
externalities as “conflicting claims of right” (313) in a world of ubiquitous transaction costs 
where “the direction in which compensation ought to be paid [is] often unclear” (302).  Frank 
and Bernanke (2001) emphasize the reciprocal nature of externality problems (277) and the 
idea that laws and regulations (such as traffic laws, zoning laws, environmental protection laws, 
and free speech laws) can promote efficiency in situations where negotiated solutions are not 
practical, provided that “they place the burden of accommodation on the parties who can 
accomplish it at the lowest cost” (Frank and Bernanke 2001, 292-93).  Silberberg (1999) 
develops a similar series of examples (including the impact of major league baseball’s “reserve 
clause” and fault vs. no-fault divorce laws) to “to illustrate the generality of transaction cost 
problems” and the impact of legal rules on the allocation of legal entitlements and other 
resources.
Among current intermediate textbooks, only Eaton, Eaton, and Allen (1999), Frank 
(2003), Grinols (1994), Landsburg (2002), and Pashigian (1998) “get it right.”  Landsburg, 
Pashigian, and Frank provide the most rigorous illustrations of what Grinols calls Coase’s “second theorem”: “If bargaining is costly and information is imperfect, then liability rules help 
achieve optimality, and the party that has the least costly way of dealing with the harmful effects 
of an externality should be made responsible for paying the costs associated with the 
externality” (Grinols 1994, 551); otherwise “[a]n improper assignment of property rights [will 
lead] to a higher marginal social cost and to a socially inferior solution” (Pashigian 715 and 711-
12).  Eaton, Eaton, and Allen offer a different view of Coase, suggesting that his analysis is best 
understood as positive (looking at what the courts did) rather than normative (2002, 580-81).  
This highlights Coase’s respect for the economic wisdom of English common law judges who, 
as Posner points out, “were quicker than the economists to recognize the reciprocal nature of 
pollution - the sense in which pollution is as much ‘caused’ by the victim as by the polluter” 
(Posner 1993, 201).
These exemplary treatments demonstrate the uniqueness of Coase’s anti-blackboard 
approach and the weaknesses of standard textbook approaches.  Equally, they show that 
Coase’s insights do not end but indeed begin once we enter the world of positive transaction 
costs.
Most Get it Wrong
Our survey found that only 14% of current introductory microeconomics texts (4 of 29) 
and 31% of current intermediate texts (5 of 16) present Coase’s “stage two” arguments. The 
rest (80% overall) do not.  This 80% comprises a broad range, from texts that make little or no 
mention of Coasean ideas in their discussions of negative externalities to those that discuss 
Coase in unusual detail yet stop short of presenting his “stage two” arguments.  
Arnold (2001) and McEachern (2000) lie at the latter extreme.  In a section titled “Pigou versus Coase,” Arnold stresses Coase’s argument that “it is not clear that the state 
should tax the person imposing the negative externality [due to] the reciprocal nature of 
externalities” (709) but does not explain the circumstances under which such a tax would or 
would not be justified on efficiency grounds.  McEachern likewise distinguishes the Coase 
analysis of externalities from “the traditional analysis of externalities [which] assumes that market 
failures arise because people ignore the external effects of their actions” (2000, 380) and calls 
attention to Coase’s argument that “the efficient solution to the externality problem depends on 
which party can avoid the problem at lower cost” (McEachern 2000, 381).  Then, much like 
Stigler, he stops, saying that “When the number of parties involved in a transaction is high, the 
chance for a voluntary agreement is small” (381).  He offers no analysis of positive transaction 
cost cases or any hint of Coase’s contributions toward such an analysis.  So one could easily 
infer from McEachern’s otherwise sophisticated discussion that government-engineered 
internalization schemes are the only feasible solution to negative externality problems when 
transaction costs are positive.
The majority of current texts provide a paragraph or two on Coase and his ideas, 
including a statement of Stigler’s theorem such as “If property rights are well defined and if 
bargaining is costless, then the private market can achieve an efficient outcome regardless of 
which of the affected parties holds the property rights” (Tregarthen and Rittenberg 2000, 357).  
Some add the assumption that “the number of people involved is small” (McConnell and Brue 
2002, 625) or specify the absence of strategic behavior (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2001, 640).  
All convey the standard Stiglerian themes: “private actors can solve the problem of externalities 
among themselves” (Mankiw 2001, 214); “the invisible hand is considerably more effective thanprevious discussions of externalities may have suggested” (Hirschleifer and Hirschleifer 1998, 
490); and, therefore, “you don’t always need government to create an efficient use of resources
when externalities arise” (Gottheil 2002, 335; original emphasis).  
But Aren’t We All Coaseans Now?
As a group, today’s textbooks are more circumspect about government solutions to 
negative externalities and more hopeful about private solutions than their predecessors 15-20 
years ago.  Even Samuelson and Nordhaus now strike a more balanced tone:
A common presumption is that some kind of government intervention is 
necessary to overcome the market failures associated with pollution and other 
externalities. In fact, modifications of property rights rather than direct 
government action can sometimes lead to an efficient outcome (Samuelson and 
Nordhaus 2001, 378).
Perhaps the most visible example is Mankiw (2001).  In contrast to the old Samuelson genre, 
Mankiw’s whole discussion of externalities is strikingly cautious. Where Samuelson would 
simply have asserted that externalities cause market failure and that government intervention is 
therefore required, Mankiw will say only that “externalities tend to cause markets to be 
inefficient” (2001, 212; emphasis added) and that “[G]overnment action is not always needed 
to solve the problem.  In some circumstances, people can develop private solutions. . . . In the 
real world, however, bargaining does not always work. . . . When private bargaining does not 
work, the government can sometimes play a role” (212-215, emphasis added).  Baumol and 
Blinder, whose discussion contains no reference to Coase, also emphasize the likelihood of 
“government failure” (Baumol and Blinder 2000, 279).  Many current texts convey this quasi-Coasean pragmatism about externality problems: presenting a range of solutions, from informal 
voluntarism to government regulations, stressing the pros and cons of each. 
From a Coasean standpoint, however, this pragmatic spirit is still attached to a 
thoroughly Pigovian way of thinking.  Externalities are still posed as perpetrator/victim problems 
(A harms B) whose possible solutions are limited to standard internalization schemes. And 
Coase’s ideas, in the guise of Stigler’s theorem, are mostly cast as “logical but impractical” 
answers to the Pigovian question: How to restrain A from harming B?.  
Mankiw again is a good example.  His discussion of possible solutions proceeds from 
pure private solutions to pure government control and finally to his preferred options: Pigovian 
taxes and tradable pollution permits.  Purely private solutions (including negotiation a la the 
standard Coase theorem) are praised for their “appealing logic” but rendered doubtful by the 
fact that “private actors on their own often fail to resolve the problems caused by externalities .  
.  .  because of transaction costs” (214).  Government regulation (“command and control”) is 
also deemed logical but inefficient (215-216).  The best solutions, then, are those that employ a 
combination of government and market forces (such as Pigovian taxes) to “[require] decision-
makers to bear the full costs of their actions [and thereby efficiently] . . . internalize the 
externality of pollution” (220).  Mankiw’s discussion is instructive because it purports to be so 
even-handed and complete; yet on closer inspection it is confined to a Pigovian framework in 
which Coase’s perspective is effectively crowded out. The name Coase stands for nothing more 
than an “invisible hand solves all” approach whose impracticality serves to persuade the reader 
that Pigovian internalization schemes are the only sensible answer to most externality problems.  
This is precisely the old Samuelson/Pigou argument, casting the Pigovian approach as the ideal economic compromise between the two extremes of laissez faire (impractical “private 
solutions”) and statism (inefficient “command and control”).  On this point Mankiw is 
unequivocal. 
There is, nevertheless, a Coase-friendly spirit in these recent texts, a willingness to say 
that “even where government action is appropriate, we must consider market-like instruments to
correct market mechanism deficiencies” (Baumol and Blinder 2000, 279).   For economists 
who wish to pursue this line of thought, and to help their students to do so, a Coasean 
perspective offers some valuable tools.  One person who might’ve wished to get more mileage 
out of Coase’s ideas was old Pigou himself, the economist who ultimately came to doubt the 
government’s ability to solve externality problems:
These gaps, positive and negative, between private and public costs were not 
much in people’s minds until recently.  Now everybody understands them.  It 
must be confessed, however, that we seldom know enough to decide in what 
fields and to what extent the State, on account of them, could usefully interfere 
with individual freedom of choice.  Moreover, even though economists were 
able to provide a perfect blueprint for beneficial State action, politicians are not 
philosopher kings and a blueprint might quickly yield place on their desks to the 
propaganda of competing pressure groups (Pigou 1954, 6).  
One can imagine a lively and enlightening dialogue between this 1954 Pigou and the 1960 
Coase concerning possible solutions to rights conflicts in the real world of scarce knowledge, 
competing pressure groups, and positive transaction costs.  Yet in most of our textbooks and 
classrooms Coase’s approach is excluded from this conversation.  Most students encounter only a Stiglerian Coase whose perfect-market theorem is of little use in trying to imagine rational 
responses to entrenched social conflicts such as wars, labor-management disputes, and 
environmental degradation.  Perhaps one way to increase the positive spillovers from our 
microeconomics courses might be to encourage students to look anew at these age-old 
problems from the standpoint of “how can A and B better accommodate one another’s 
interests?” rather than “how can we restrain A from harming B?”.  
CONCLUSION
Most current microeconomics textbooks fail to recognize the conceptual, 
methodological, and policy differences between Coasean and blackboard 
(Pigou/Stigler/Samuelson) approaches to externalities.  Treatments are better at the intermediate 
level and better still in certain field texts.  But overall we find David Friedman’s 1991 statement 
to be correct: “[T]o a considerable extent, what is taught in the textbooks is the [externality] 
theory as it existed before Coase.”
These findings are potentially useful to economic educators who are looking to enhance 
their students’ critical thinking skills.  A Coasean approach encourages students to think beyond 
the victim/perpetrator model.  It gives them the tools to understand laws and policies (such as 
no-fault divorce, or laws allowing noisy commercial aircraft to fly over private property without 
permission or compensation) that simply do not make sense from a Pigovian standpoint.  More 
generally, a Coasean approach can help students move beyond the initial stage of intellectual 
development that William Perry (1970) and Craig Nelson (1989) describe as “dualism”:
In this mode, the intellectual world is seen dualistically . . . ideas seem clearly 
right or wrong.  Students assume that valid questions have certain answers and that teachers should teach those answers or unambiguous rules for finding them 
(Nelson 1989, 17).
Microeconomics courses may inadvertently reinforce dualistic thinking inasmuch as they (we) 
teach students to analyze problems for which a single correct answer - e.g., an optimal 
allocation of resources - can be deduced from a graph, table, or set of equations.  To be sure, 
there is no simple relationship between teaching methods and students’ intellectual development. 
Some students (especially those able to think in non-dualistic ways) will find plenty of stimulus 
for critical thinking in conventionally taught courses.  Cooter seems to have had this experience 
in teaching, of all things, the standard Coase theorem: “Anyone who has taught the Coase 
Theorem to fresh minds has experienced first hand the wonder and admiration which it inspires” 
(1987, 457).  At worst, however, these blackboard approaches inhibit students’ intellectual 
growth by modeling “the economic way of thinking” as a deductive search for a single correct 
answer.  
Coase’s critique of blackboard economics arose from a similar concern.  He believed 
that professional economists had become too dependent upon the Cold War dualism of 
markets-vs.-government and similarly simplistic models of externality problems:
The usual treatment of [externality] problems .  .  .  proceeds in terms of a 
comparison between a state of laissez faire and some kind of ideal world. . . . A 
better approach would seem to be to start our analysis with a situation 
approximating that which actually exists, to examine the effects of a proposed 
policy change and to attempt to decide whether the new situation would be, in 
total, better or worse than the original one.  In this way, conclusions for policy would have some relevance to the actual situation (1960, 43).
Viewed in this light, a Coasean approach to externalities opens the door to a rich critical 
thinking exercise.  The objective is well defined (to choose “those legal rules, procedures, and 
administrative structures which will maximize the value of production” [Coase 1988, 28]) but, 
as Coase would emphasize, the institutional means of achieving it are variable and uncertain.  
Students are forced to choose among second-best alternatives without any theoretical guarantee 
that their preferred solution will be welfare-improving.  They face genuine uncertainty, an 
essential first step towards critical thinking.  They also discover that in such an uncertain world it 
is impossible to draw or defend policy conclusions without recourse to normative criteria.  This 
brings them to the highest levels of critical/Coasean thinking wherein “previously hidden value 
judgments [are] made explicit in the comparison of [the alternatives]” (Medema 1994, 94).  
Coase’s contributions are as novel and important in our post-Cold War world as they 
were in 1960.  His departure from the blackboard economics of Pigou/Stigler/Samuelson was 
an attempt to increase “critical thinking” among professional economists.  Perhaps today it can 
inspire us to develop new pedagogies (e.g., case-study methods similar to those used in many 
law schools) to achieve the same goal with our students.REFERENCES
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